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I. Introduction
If experts say a "malicious [cyber] code"' has "similar effects" 2
to a "physical bomb,"' and that code actually causes "a stunning
breach of global internet stability,"4 is it really accurate to call that

t General Dunlap is a Professor of the Practice and the Executive Director of the Center
on Law, Ethics and National Security at Duke University School of Law having retired
from the Air Force's Judge Advocate General Corps in 2010 after more than 34 years of
service. The author wishes to than Ms. Kathleen Cusack and Ms. Amy Richardson for
their invaluable assistance with this article.
1 Joseph Menn et al., Cyber Attacks DisruptPayPal, Twitter, Other Sites, REUTERS
(Oct.
21,
2016,
9:31
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyberidUSKCN12LIME [https://perma.cc/XR8H-XQ3M].
2 Sara Ashley O'Brien, 'Unprecedented' Cyberattack Involved Tens of Millions of
IP
Addresses,
CNN
(Oct.
22,
2016,
6:57
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/22/technology/dyn-cyberattack/ [https://perma.cc/RRY2YDBB].
3 Id.
4 Menn et al., supra note 1.
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event merely an instance of a "cyber attack"?s
Moreover, can you really expect to deter state and non-state
actors from employing such code and similarly hostile cyber
methodologies if all they think that they are risking is being
labeled as a cyber-vandal subject only to law enforcement
measures? Or might they act differently if it were made clear to
them that such activity is considered an "armed attack"'6 against
the United States and that they are in jeopardy of being on the
receiving end of a forceful, law-of-war response by the most
powerful military on the planet?'
Of course, if something really is just vandalism, the law
enforcement paradigm, with its very limited response options,
would suffice. But when malevolent cyber activity endangers the
reliability of the internet in a world heavily dependent on a secure
cyberspace, it is not merely vandalism. Rather, it is a national and
international security threat that ought to be characterized and
Unfortunately, the United States' current
treated as such.'
approach is too inscrutable and even contradictory to send an
effective deterrence message to potential cyber actors. This needs
to change.
This article proceeds in seven parts. Part II describes a recent
breach of United States cyber security and the inherent
vulnerability it reveals. Part III outlines the jumbled U.S. response
to cyber-attacks and the current orientation of U.S. policy on the
matter. Part IV argues that an ambiguous U.S. policy that leans
toward a law enforcement approach rather than going through the
law of war architecture is thwarting cyber deterrence. Even if

5 Jilian Mincer, Companies Urged to Use Multiple Vendors in Wake of Cyber
Attack, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2016, 9:40 PM), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/us-usa-cyber-

companies-idUSKCN120041 [https://perma.cc/L6MIH-GTZV].
6 Collin Allan, Was the Cyber Attack on a Dam in New York an Armed Attack?,
JUST SECURITY (Jan. 8, 2016, 1:10 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/28720/cyberattack-dam-armed-attack/ [https://perma.cc/4EWN-ZT36].
7 See Jeremy Bender, RANKED: The World's 20 Strongest Militaries, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2016, 10:24 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/these-are-theworlds-20-strongest-militaries-ranked-2016-4 [https://perma.cclNL7X-ZU2L].
8 See Cristina Dolan, Cybersecurity Is A Global Threat To Democracy, Yet Not
7, 2016, 9:00 AM),
Understood, FORBES TECH. COUNCIL (Nov.
Well
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2016/11/07/cybersecurity-is-a-global[https://perma.cc/5UEMthreat-to-democracy-yet-not-well-understood/#5a5302375c2f

T2PL].
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recent cyber-attacks are not life threatening, the failure to establish
an adequate proportionate response to these attacks will only
incentivize further threats against U.S. national security [Part V].
Part VI explains how clarifying the law will ultimately enhance
cyber deterrence. Finally, Part VII develops a broader view of the
implications for Russia and China's mutual influence on cyber
security law and the development of international norms. This
article concludes with a thought to the future [Part VIII]. With
each cyber-attack that passes without adequate response or proper
characterization, the U.S. and others risk losing the global debate
on cyber security and the role of International Humanitarian Law
in deterring these forms of attack.
II. "A stunning breach of global internet stability."
Already it is evident that the United States has a cyber
deterrence problem.9 Consider the massive disruption of the
Internet 10 that took place on October 21, 2016.u Twitter, PayPal,
Spotify, and many other popular websites were virtually shut
down when Dyn, a domain name system 12 ("DNS") provider that
functions as a "switchboard" for an enormous amount of internet
traffic, was shut down. Reuters characterized the cyber crisis as "a
stunning breach of global internet stability." 1 3
What made .this cyber incident especially worrisome was that
expert "attackers apparently used tens of thousands of hacked
internet devices-household appliances such as digital video
recorders, security cameras, and internet routers-to generate a
massive amount of digital traffic" that jammed the system and
grounded it to a halt several times. 1 4
Although Web functionality was more or less reconstituted by
the end of the day, the Dyn attack may signal things to come. A
9 See generally O'Brien, supra note 2 (discussing how a number of popular
websites were inaccessible to some users "in a massive cyberattack with international
reach").
10

See id.
11 See Menn et al., supra note 1.
12 See id.
1 3 Id.

14 Steven Melendez, After Years Of Warnings, Internet Of Things Devices To
Blame For Big Internet Attack, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 23, 2016, 8:35 AM),

https://www.fastcompany.com/3064904/after-years-of-warnings-intemet-of-things
devices-to-blame-for-bi g-intemet-attack [https://perma.cc/Z324-H3CZ].
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retired intelligence officer ominously suggested that it may have
been a probing attack-that is, one designated to enable an
attacker to "eventually launch a devastating, Pearl Harbor-type
cyber-attack."" Bruce Schneier commented that even before the
most recent incident, the "precisely calibrated [cyber] attacks"" of
recent months "feel[] like a nation's military cybercommand trying
to calibrate its weaponry in the case of cyberwar.""
Nation-states are not alone in the quest to deter nefarious
internet activity, as non-state actors can also cause serious
disruption. For example, Mr. James Clapper, the Director of
National Intelligence, indicates that "it 'appears to be preliminarily
the case"' that a non-state actor may be responsible for the Dyn
attacks.'8 Regardless, the vulnerability to a range of hostile actors
is painfully evident: the devices exploited in this event, which are
made with some parts "coming from Chinese suppliers [and] have
weak or no password protections," are extremely common." Intel
Corporation predicts that the world will have 200 billion of such
devices by 2020, so it is unlikely that we have seen the last of
these cyber emergencies.20
III. Cyber Vandalism or Digital Acts of War?
Surveying the wide-ranging impact of the Dyn web calamity,
15 RC Porter, Massive Cyber Attack on the Internet Underway; Is This a Probe?

And, Part of a Larger Strategy by a Nation-State, Terrorists, Others - To Launch a
Cyber Pearl Harbor-Type Attack?, FORTUNA'S CORNER (Oct. 21, 2016),
http://fortunascorner.com/2016/10/21/massive-cyber-attack-on-the-intemet-underway-isthis-a-probe-and-part-of-a-larger-strategy-by-a-nation-state-terrorists-others-to-launch-acyber-pearl-harbor-type-attack/ [https://perma.cc/P8DU-SMBR] [hereinafter Massive
Cyber Attack].
16 Bruce Schneier, Someone Is Learning How to Take Down the Internet, SCHNEIER
2016),
13,
(Sept.
SECURITY
ON
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/09/someone-islear.html
[https://perma.cc/D5EB-PLYY].
17 Id.
18 Laura Wagner, US. Intelligence Chief Says Internet Outage Was Likely the Work
PM),
12:00
2016,
26,
(Oct.
SLATE
Actor,
Non-State
a
of
http://www.slate.comlblogs/future-tense/2016/10/26/james-clapper-says-intemet-outag
e_was_1ikely-the-work_of a-nonstateactor.html [https://perma.cc/Y5DH-9V93].
19 David Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, A New Era of Internet Attacks Powered by
2016),
22,
(Oct.
TIMEs
N.Y.
Devices,
Everyday
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/us/politics/a-new-era-of-internet-attacks-poweredby-everyday-devices.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/9R6C-7P3Z].
20 See id.
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an analyst observed that "[e]ven though [the malware involved in
the attack is] not a physical bomb, it has some similar effects."21
The question then is-does the United States consider this
unprecedentedly severe incident, involving as it does a cyber
capability that has similar effects to a physical bomb, to be a
digital act of war?
Evidently not. Even though the facts of the massive shutdown
would seem to equate the incident with a traditional kinetic attack,
NBC news reports a senior U.S. intelligence official as rather
dismissively classifying the incident as just "a classic case of
internet vandalism."22
The official's characterization conforms to what the United
States has said previously about the legal status of certain cyber
events. It is important to understand that "act of war" is a political
term, not one of international law. In the post-UN Charter era, the
"act of war" idiom is at odds with the underlying thrust of the
Charter and especially Article 2(4).23 Article 2(4) demands that
"[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations."24 In essence, "war" as it
is historically understood, is all but illegal; disputes are to be
resolved by peaceful means.
There are, however, narrow exceptions to the prohibitions
against the use of force. Force is allowed when the Security
Council authorizes it under Article 42 of the Charter.25
Additionally, a nation may employ force in self-defense when it
has suffered what Article 51 describes as an "armed attack."26
O'Brien, supra note 2.
Berkeley Lovelace, Dyn Says Cyberattack "Resolved" After Services Shut Down,
NBC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/dyn-says
cyberattack-resolved-after-services-shut-down-n670926 [https://perma.cc/EJ2R-NFB2].
23 U.N. Charter art. 2, �4.
24 Id.
25 Id. art. 42.
26 Id. art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
21
22

N.C. J. INT'L L.

994

[Vol. XLII

The law does not define exactly what form of forceful response
a country may take in a legitimate act of self-defense except to say
it must be necessary and proportional.27 Nor does it limit a selfdefense response in a cyber-situation to an "in-kind" response.28
The United States, for example, could initiate a self-defense
response to a cyber-attack which might include the use of
traditional kinetic force involving conventional military weapons.29
The language of the United States' response to the Dyn attack
renders unclear as to when the United States considers itself to
have suffered an "armed attack" in the cyber context, so as to
trigger a right to self-defense under Article 51. Despite the
enormous dimensions of the Dyn onslaught, the official's claim
that it is simply "cyber vandalism" (as opposed to any sort of
"attack") seems to suggest that the U.S. doesn't consider it serious
enough to permit a self-defense response within the meaning of
Charter. This characterization is rather ironic as the United States
has previously expressed a rather aggressive stance regarding what
sort of cyber incidents could authorize forceful acts in selfdefense.
In a seminal 2012 speech, the then-Legal Advisor to the State
Department Harold Koh staked out the U.S. position.30 Initially,
he affirmed that the "established jus ad bellum rules do apply to
uses of force in cyberspace."3 1 He went on to explain that "cyber
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain
or restore international peace and security."). Most nations also believe Article 51
incorporates an inherent right to act in anticipatory self-defense when an armed attack
against them is imminent.
27 U.N. Charter arts. 42, 51.
28 Id.

29 See Graham Allison, How the US and China Will Go To War, NATIONAL
INTEREST (Apr. 12, 2017), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-america-china-couldstumble-war-20150?page=7 [https://perma.cc/J2MK-ZRZ9] (explaining that a country,
in this instance China, could use kinetic weapons as a result on a mainland attack).
30 Ellen Nakashima, Cyber Attacks Could Trigger Self-Defense Rule, U.S. Official
Says, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/us-official-says-cyberattacks-can-trigger-self-defenserule/2012/09/18/c2246cla-0202-1 1e2-b26032f4a8db9b7e-story.html?utmterm=.2f59aab3e7be [https://perma.cc/JF45-35A5].
31 Chris Borgen, Harold Koh On International Law in Cyberspace, OPINIO JURIS
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/09/19/harold-koh-on-international-law-incyberspace/ [https://perma.cc/2BD4-QXQ3]; Karma Nabulsi, Jus Ad Bellwn/ Jus In
Bello, CRIMES OF WAR, http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/jus-ad-bellum-jus-inbello/ [https://perma.cc/B3WU-82AL] (Jus ad bellum is that "branch of law that defines
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act1v1tJ.es that proximately result in death, m3ury, or significant
[physical] destruction would likely be viewed as a use of force." 32
Pointedly, he also said that "if the physical consequences of a
cyber-attack work the kind of physical damage that dropping a
bomb or firing a missile would, that cyber-attack should equally be
considered a use of force."33 In light of the claim that last week's
incident has "some similar effects" to a "physical bomb," was the
Koh threshold met? Or does the absence of "death, injury, or
significant destruction" make it fall short in the U.S.'s view?34
It is not clear. Koh makes it hard to determine because he said
that the U.S. "has for a long time taken the position that the
inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal
use of force" adding that "[in the U.S.'s] view, there is no
threshold for a use of deadly force to qualify as an 'armed attack'
that may warrant a forcible response."35 In other words, from the
U.S. perspective, there is no difference between "force" as used in
Article 2 of the UN Charter and "armed attack" as used in Article
51.36

This interpretation of the law is, internationally, a distinctly
minority view, as Professor Michael Schmitt and other cyberlaw
experts have noted.37 It creates a complication because most
interpretations of international law find that there are actions
which might constitute "force" under Article 2, but not involve the
kind of proximate "death, injury, or significant destruction"
typically associated with an "armed attack."38 Citing Nicaragua v.
U.S., Schmitt provides an illustration with obvious implications for
the U.S. position on cyber uses of force:
[f]he International Court of Justice held that although merely
funding guerrillas who were conducting hostilities against

the legitimate reasons a state may engage in war and focuses on certain criteria that
render a war just.").
32 Borgen, supra note 31.
33 Id.
34 O'Brien, supra note 2.
35 Borgen, supra note 31.
36 See Andrew C. Foltz, Stu.xnet, Schmitt Analysis, and The Cyber "Use-Of-Force"
Debate, 67 JFQ 40, 41-42 (2012).
37 Id.
38 See Michael N. Schmitt, International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and
Tallinn Manualluxtaposed, 54 HARV. INT'LLJ.13, 19 (2012).
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another State did not reach the use of force threshold, arming
and training them did. The holding suggests that an act need not
have immediate physical consequences to comprise a use of
force.3 9
When the Nicaragua holding is juxtaposed with Koh's
assertion that "force" and "armed attack" are conterminous, it
seems that the United States should consider a grave cyber event
like the Dyn attack as the legal equivalent to an "armed attack"
even if it did not produce "death, injury, or significant
destruction."40 After all, if the U.S. position is that any use of
force is enough to justify an Article 51 response, disrupting half
the global internet with a methodology with effects similar to a
"physical bomb" would certainly seem to be at least as significant
as arming and training guerrillas in a single country.
To consider an incident as severe as the Dyn case as sufficient
to put the perpetrators at risk of a forceful self-defense response
not only would conform to the existing U.S. interpretation, but
also could signal a norm evolution consonant with Article 51. The
2013 Tallinn Manual, which many consider to be the leading
treatise on the international law applicable to cyberwar, does find
that "force" as used in Article 2(4) is different from the arguably
more egregious "armed attack" as set out in Article 51.41 At the
same time, however, its included commentary reports that the
group of experts who drafted the Tallinn Manual found the law
was "unsettled" as to whether "actions that do not result in injury,
death, damage or destruction, but which otherwise have extensive
negative effects" could amount to an armed attack.42
In fact, we may be seeing a shift towards broader acceptance of
the idea that cyber incidents with widespread adverse effects are
enough to trigger an Article 51 response, even without any
physical injuries or damage. In 2015, two years after the issuance
of the Tallinn Manual, Professor Schmitt, who was the project's
director, agreed that if a cyber operation shut down the national
39 Id. at 20; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Summary of the Summary of the Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/?sum=367&pl=3&p2=3&case=70&p3=5
[https://perma.cc/UB4L-XVDW].
40 See Schmitt, supra note 38.
41 MICHAEL N. ScHM-Ir

ET AL., TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW

APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE
42

Id. at 56.

42 (2013).

2017

997

economy without death or destruction, it would nevertheless
"probably" meet the more demanding "armed attack" threshold.43
In addition, UCLA's Professor Kristen Eichensehr noted the
conundrum that "cyber weapons create the possibility of actions
that cause severe harm to the victim, but nevertheless do not result
in physical damage or injury to persons."44 Consequently, she
predicted, "it is possible that over time a cyber-specific definition
of armed attack may arise that does not require physical harm,
even though physical harm is required for armed attacks caused by
other sorts of weapons."45 With the experience of the Dyn case,
that time may be now.
The U.S. interpretation of the law would seem to be open to
such a finding. In the first place, the 2015 U.S. Department of
Defense's ("DoD") Law of War Manual ("Manual") confirms in
Chapter XVI ("Cyber Operations") that the law of war applies to
cyber, but admits that "[p]recisely how the law of war applies to
cyber operations is not well-settled, and aspects of the law in this
area are likely to continue to develop, especially as new cyber
capabilities are developed and States determine their views in
response to such development."46
Next, the Manual goes on to essentially incorporate the Koh
approach _by saying, "if cyber operations cause effects that, if
caused by traditional physical means, would be regarded as a use
of force under }us ad bellum, then such cyber operations would
likely also be regarded as a use of force."47 This intriguingly
suggests that a use of force sufficient for jus ad bellum might exist
even in the absence of physical injuries or destruction.
How? In listing examples of acts that could meet the use of
force standard, the Manual says: "cyber operations that cripple a
military's logistics systems, and thus its ability to conduct and
sustain military operations, might also be considered a use of force
43 Ryan Fairchild, When Can a Hacker Start a War?, PACIFIC STANDARD (Feb. 6,
2015),
https://psmag.com/when-can-a-hacker-start-a-war-9a59bfcf9526#.ktt4xu55p
[https://perma.cc/A6FH-HDAR].
44 Kristen E. Eichensehr, Cyberwar & International Law Step Zero, 50 TEX. lNT'L
LJ. 355,374 (2015).
45

Id.

46 OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP'T. OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF
WAR MANUAL 994 (June 2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
47 Id. at 998.
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under jus ad bellum." 48 The footnote supporting this proposition
points to a 1999 publication, An Assessment of InternationalLegal
Issues in Information Operations, by the DoD Office of the
General Counsel .49 That document says:
Even if the systems attacked were unclassified military logistics
systems, an attack on such systems might seriously threaten a
nation's security. For example, corrupting the data in a nation's
computerized systems for managing its military fuel, spare parts,
transportation, troop mobilization, or medical supplies may
seriously interfere with its ability to conduct military operations.
In short, the consequences are likely to be more important than
the means used.50
This illustrates that at least from the DoD's perspective, if a
cyber event has significant a casus belli even in the absence of
physical injuries or destruction. The relevant question then would
be: doesn't an assault that caused "a stunning breach of global
internet stability" and shut down half the internet qualify?
Complicating the issue is the July 2016 testimony before
Congress by the State Department's Coordinator for Cyber Issues,
Christopher Painter as to what he called "digital acts of war." 5
According to Painter, in determining on a "case-by-case, factspecific" basis whether a cyber activity constitutes an "armed
attack" "sufficient to trigger ...

[the] right of self-defense," "the

actual or anticipated effects of a particular incident" are of
Painter says "the U.S. government
"primary importance.
believes that states should consider the nature and extent of injury
or death to persons and the destruction of, or damage to,
property."53 If the cyber act "proximately" causes "death, injury,

48 Id. at 998-99.
49
50

Id. at 999 n.21.
Id. (quoting in an explanatory parenthetical the OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP'T.

OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

(2nd ed., 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INT'L L. STUDIES 459, 483

(2002)).
51 See Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cybersecurity Conversation: Hearing on
"DigitalActs of War: Evolving the Cybersecurity Conversation" Before the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittees on Information Security and
National Security, 114th Cong. 4 (2016) (testimony of Christopher M. E. Painter,
Coordinator for Cyber Issues, U.S. Department of State).
52 Id.
53 Id.
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or significant destruction" it "likely would be viewed as an armed
attack." 54
The problem, of course, is that while Painter's formulation
includes the· obvious "death, injury, or significant destruction"
standard,55 it does not necessarily preclude finding that non
destructive cyber events could also produce "actual or anticipated
effects"56 sufficient to permit an Article 51 response. It seems that
Painter intentionally meant to be rather enigmatic as he also
claims:
As a general matter, states have not sought to define precisely
(or state conclusively) what situations would constitute armed
attacks in other domains, and there is no reason cyberspace
should be different. In fact, there is a good reason not to
articulate a bright line, as strategic ambiguity could very well
deter most states from getting close to it.

IV. Does Calling a Severe Disruption "Cyber Vandalism"
Deter or Incentivize?
While there may be a place for ambiguity in strategic
deterrence, the Dyn cyberattack of late 2016 shows that it is not
working for the United States. The reason for this could well be
the trivializing public characterization the government has been
giving to events like the Dyn incident, in addition to the
government's tendency to apply similar language even when
physical damage actually results. In the law, words do matter.
Portraying something as "cyber vandalism" would not permit the
United States to legally respond in the same way it could if it had
been struck by a "physical bomb." This discrepancy in incident
description could have serious consequences for the development
of deterrence in relation to cyber events.
Put another way, vandalism is ordinarily understood as a minor
criminal law matter involving judicial processes, and not
something that would sanction the use of force. As an
international law matter, retorsion57 and countermeasures58 might
54

55
56

57

Id.
Id.
Id.
What

is Retorsion, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910),
http://thelawdictionary.org/retorsion/ [https://perma.cc/HLF8-UASL].
58 Michael N. Schmitt, "Below the Threshold" Cyber Operations: The
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be available as responses to vandalism-as may other remedies
under the law of state responsibility 5 9-but none of these options
allow the use of force. By contrast, activities that equate to
"physical bombs" could readily be viewed as a national security
threat sufficient to prompt a pre-emptive response, where an
acceptable response could be the necessary and proportional use of
force to counter them.' To reiterate, the law enforcement
paradigm suggested by "vandalism" is very different from the law
of war architecture that arises from national security threats, as the
"law enforcement" response to vandalism is much more limited.6 1
Yet even where the cyber incident unquestionably fulfills the
"physical damage" criteria, the United States inexplicably softens
its classification. For example, in 2014, President Obama used the
term "cybervandalism" in denying that North Korea's cyber
operation against Sony Pictures constituted an "act of war." 62
However, the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy document
released in April of 2015" described the Sony incident in much
more serious terms, saying:
North Korea conducted a cyberattack against Sony Pictures
Entertainment,

rendering thousands of Sony

computers

inoperable and breaching Sony's confidential business
information. In addition to the destructive nature of the attacks,
North Korea stole digital copies of a number of unreleased
movies, as well as thousands of documents containing sensitive
data regarding celebrities, Sony employees, and Sony's business
CountermeasuresResponse Option and InternationalLaw, 54 VA. INT'L LJ. 697,70001 (2014) (defining countermeasures).

59 See G.A. Res. 56/83, 223-25 (Dec. 12, 2001) (describing remedies available in
different courts based on the law of state responsibility).
60 See RYAN DOWDY ET AL., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 38 (5th ed. 2015)
(reaffirming the use of preemptive force against rogue states that present a threat to the
United States).
61 See Jan Hessbruegge, The Right to Life as the Jus ad Bellum of NonInternationalArmed Conflict (A Reply to Lieblich), JUST SECURITY (OcT. 27, 2016, 1:48
https://www.justsecurity.org/33906/life-jus-ad-bellum-non-international-armedPM),
conflict-a-reply-lieblich/ [https://perma.cc/RUA7-WJ6E] (stating "[u]nder international
law, the human right to life tightly limits the use of lethal force to contain threats to law
and order").
62 Eric Bradner, Obama: North Korea's Hack Not War, But 'Cybervandilism',
CNN (Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/21/politics/obama-north-koreashack-not-war-but-cyber-vandalism/ [https://perma.cclV4Z6-LJGU].
63 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., THE DOD CYBER STRATEGY (2015).
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operations. North Korea accompanied their cyberattacks with
coercion, intimidation, and the threat of terrorism. The North
Korean attack on Sony was one of the most destructive
64
cyberattacks on a U.S. entity to date.

Likewise, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
and Counterterrorism, Lisa Monaco, said in July of 2016 that the
Sony attack "had crossed a threshold," adding that it "was both
destructive, it fried the computers of Sony Pictures, took them
offline[,] and it was coercive."65 Given the evidence of physical
destruction, it is hard to argue that the Sonny attack did not meet
the United States' -and indeed the world's- definition of "armed
attack."
Regarding last summer's hack of thousands of Democratic
National Committee ("DNC") emails, Ms. Monaco emphasized
the gravity of the event, calling it a "serious, serious issue, a
serious thing if there is deliberate intrusion for the purpose of
coercing and influencing the political process."66 The distinctive
nature of the target-the U.S. election system-caused John
Brennan, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to conclude
that "[o]bviously interference in the U.S. election process is a
very, very serious matter."67
Despite the consensus about the seriousness and uniqueness of
cyber efforts to interfere with the political process, the President
again sought to downplay the incidents. In early September, he
"acknowledged that the Russians have been attacking U.S.
institutions on the intemet"68 but has also said that:
64

Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
THE ASPEN INST., ASPEN �ECURITY FORUM 2016: THE VIEW FROM THE WEST
WING 13 (2016), http://aspensecurityforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/lisamonaco-the-view-from-the-west-wing.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QXX-MMVB].
66 Id. at 17; see also Aaron Blake, Here are the Latest, Most Damaging Thing in
the
DNC's
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· Emails,
FIX
(July
25,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/20 l 6/07 /24/here-are-the-latest-most
damaging-things-in-the-dncs-leaked-emails/?utm_term= .9c955ec7 c00d
[https://perma.cc/C2WR-DR7S] (regarding the DNC hack).
67 THE ASPEN INST., ASPEN SECURITY FORUM 2016: A CANDID CONVERSATION WITH
THE DIRECTOR OF THE CIA 29 (2016), http://aspensecurityforum.org/wp
content/uploads/2016/07 /a-candid-conversation-with-the-director-of-the-cia.pdf
[https:/ /perma.cc/XU94-KEYY].
68 Dave Boyer, Obama Says He Doesn't Want 'Wild West' Cyberwar with Russia,
WASH. TIMES (Sep. 5, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/5/obama
says-he-doesnt-want-wild-west-cyberwar-russi/ [https://perma.cc/UT43-XRRG].
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Our goal is not to suddenly in the cyber arena duplicate a cycle
of escalation that we saw when it comes to other arms races in
the past, but rather to start instituting some norms so that
everybody's acting responsibly .... What we cannot do is have
a situation in which suddenly this becomes the wild, wild West,
where countries that have significant cybercapacity start
engaging in unhealthy competition or conflict through these
means. 69
By early October, the U.S. government was nevertheless
explicitly accusing the Russian government of directing what the
U.S. government was calling "compromises" of-but not "attacks"
on-cyber systems.7 0 The U.S. government claimed that "thefts
and disclosures" were "intended to interfere with the [U.S.]
election process."" Without referencing a legal basis, Josh Ernest,
the White House Press Secretary, said in October 2016-before
the Dyn case-that there would be no legal response to these
"thefts and disclosures."7 2 Ernest therefore added to the legal
muddle because, although there was no legal response, he insisted
that there would be a "proportional" response."
The response to a criminal matter like a "compromise" or
"disclosure" or even a "theft" is a judicial one; a "proportional"
response is, however, the language of force sounding in jus ad
bellum, not law enforcement. Confusingly, he also said it "is
unlikely that our response would be announced in advance"74
again, jus ad bellum terms mixed with criminal law rhetoric. It is
true, that an "armed attack" could also be a criminal offense, but
the way it is being publicly presented suggests little cognizance of
the critical differences between the two legal regimes, or the effect
69
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70 Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Joint Statement from the
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on deterrence those differences might have.

V. Deterrence and Dithering?
Mr. Ernest further complicated the matter when he asserted
"[i]t's certainly possible that the President could choose response
options that we never announce."75 This is hardly what would or
should occur if the actions were really just vandalism-a criminal
law matter-and is not the way to go about deterring actors from
similar behavior. How will people be deterred if the consequences
are unknown? Adding to the confusion are press reports that
suggest experts are not optimistic about the United State's vision
of what the "proportional" response should be; announced or not.
Harvard Law Professor Jack Goldsmith,76 long a critic of what
he calls the United State's "feckless" cyber deterrence policy ,77
warned that the U.S. government's "dithering"78 in response to
previous cyber incidents (including the 2015 Office of Personnel
Management data breach79 that may have affected as many as 22
million people 80) was dangerous. Professor Goldsmith avowed
that:
Such a pattern of vacillation in response to very damaging
cyber-operations will not deter our adversaries; it will embolden
them. It will especially embolden them since the responses the
USG finally settles on are much less than proportionate to the

75
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81

damage caused.
Susan Hennessy, a legal scholar at the Brookings Institute,
differed somewhat with Goldsmith and instead asserted that U.S.
deterrence policy has been successful to the extent that the United
States "has never been the victim of a cyber-attack that genuinely
threatened lives."8 2 She also helpfully notes that the "[Obama]
Administration quietly released its policy on cyber deterrence late
last year."" The policy stated: "the Administration is most
concerned about threats that could cause wide-scale disruption,
destruction, loss of life, and significant economic consequences for
the United States and its interests."84 Such attacks would include
(but are not limited to):
Cyber-attacks or other malicious cyber activity intended to
cause casualties;"
Cyber-attacks or other malicious cyber activity intended to
cause significant disruption to the normal functioning of U.S.
society or government, including attacks against critical
infrastructure that could damage systems used to provide key
services to the public or the government;8 6
Cyber-attacks or other malicious cyber activity that
threatens the command and control of U.S. military forces, the
freedom of maneuver of U.S. military forces, or the infrastructure
on which the U.S. military relies to defend U.S. interests and
commitments; 87
Malicious cyber activity that undermines national
economic security through cyber-enabled economic espionage or
sabotage.8
Hennessey believes that tampering with the mechanisms of the
election is still a "below the threshold" activity (that is, below the
"armed attack" standard), although she agrees that such actions
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combined with others might collectively exceed it.89 She also
points to Phil Walters' work,90 describing a sophisticated Russian
strategy to employ various "below established threshold activities"
("BETA"), and its relation to deterrence.91 Ms. Hennessey argues
that while the United States' deterrence is working, in that it is
"effectively preventing very serious activity, at least for now," its
responses to BETA," are reactive and unpredictable, which
undercuts the deterrent effect."92 She closes by articulating a
belief that:
U.S. deterrence policy currently has the feeling of roulette.
Maybe the house still wins overall, but it is clear that actors like
Russia are happy to keep spinning the wheel while they're
ahead.93

Less than two weeks after Hennessey wrote her piece, an
undeterred actor launched the Dyn assault that hobbled half of the
Web.94 Even the Department of Homeland Security admitted just
a month before the Dyn attack that the U.S. "has experienced
increasingly severe and significant cyber incidents affecting both
the private sector and Federal Govemment."95 That admission,
along with the new Dyn case, ought to make it clear that the
United States needs to retool its cyber deterrence strategy.
VI. What to Do?
Clarifying the law on cyber security and the rights of countries
to self-defense against cyber-attacks will help to alleviate these
struggles with ambiguity.
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A. Clarifying Terms

-

Deterrence is a devilishly complex endeavor, especially where
cyber is concerned - but clarifying the law can help. Shortly after
the Dyn incident, Mr. Clapper lamented:
[W]e don't have enough body of law yet. We haven't, in my
opinion - this is not company policy; it's just me speaking
but we have not been able to generate either the substance or the
psychology of deterrence in the cyber realm. And that's going
to continue to be an issue for us.96
Regardless of whether Clapper is actually correct about
whether an adequate body of law exists to support deterrence, it is
true that many others have that perception. 7 In truth, the law itself
may not be as much as of a problem as the proper application of
the law (and especially the United States' view of it) to the facts.
That proper application can be facilitated by cleaning up the
language officials use in regards to cyber incidents, and to
synchronize it with announced U.S. interpretations.
To effectively deter, consistency and accuracy of language is
indispensable. Since the United States has elected to characterize
any use of force as sufficient to trigger a right to self- defense
under Article 51, when events occur that plainly meet that standard
(and even in the event that they cross the more demanding "armed
attack" threshold), then they need to be declared a use of force.
For example, if the descriptions by DoD and government officials
about the scope and intensity of the physical damage inflicted by
North Korea in the Sony cyber incident are accurate, it quite
obviously meets the standard establish in the Koh speech, the DoD
Law of War Manual, and Painter's testimony.9 8
96 Interview by Charlie Rose with James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence,
in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/conversation-jamesclapper/p38426 [https://perma.cclL3CA-V98R].
97 See, e.g., Frank J Cilluffo and Sharon, Global Ransomware Attack Reinforces
Message of Trump's New Cybersecurity Order, THE CONVERSATION (May 12, 2017,
3:51 PM EDT), https://theconversation.com/global-ransomware-attack-reinforces[https://perma.cc/9ZCQ-LHV9]
message-of-trumps-new-cybersecurity-order-72239
("One crucial element that has been largely missing from American cybersecurity efforts
so far is cyber-deterrence.").
98 Harold Honhgu Koh, Legal Advisor of the Dep't of State, International Law in
Cyberspace,
Address to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012),
[https://perma.cc/5FFP-8RKM];
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edulfss-papers/4854
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Watering down official characterizations of the Sony attack
(where computers were "fried" and "thousands" of them rendered
"inoperable") to merely being an incident of cybervandalism
carries real consequences. At best, confusion arises, and at worst,
a norm develops that gives potential cyber adversaries reason to
believe that even if they inflict damage on that level, scale, and
intensity, they will not face anything worse than an indictment in a
U.S. court-that will never result in an actual prosecution.
To be sure, there are acts that may appropriately be
characterized as solely cybervandalism. For example, in early
2015 when Islamic State hackers penetrated U.S. Central
Command99 social media accounts, the United States branded it as
"purely a case of cybervandalism." 100 Even though the hackers
posted "threatening messages and propaganda videos, along with
some military documents," the command maintained that the
"operation military networks were not compromised and there was
no operational impact to U.S. Central Command." 101 Every hostile
cyber activity cannot and should not be characterized as a use of
force, even under the US's more permissive standard.
It does help when, as noted above, the United States
specifically defines the cyber activities it wants to explicitly
deter. 102 The problem with this is that it may include activities
cyber espionage for example-that are rightly violative of
domestic U.S. law, but would not necessarily be something that
the United States and its allies would want to be considered in
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international law, at least at the moment, as a casus belli.103 It may
be suitable for the development of new normsl0 4 not involving
force in light of the enormous capability of cyber methodologies,
but a clear delineation between what authorizes a forceful
response, and what is limited to other options is needed.
In short, for deterrence to work there needs to be more
precision in the official language used to describe specific
incidents that comports to the United States' own interpretation of
a use of force that would authorize a response in self-defense.os If
the facts show an incident being characterized as a use of force
sufficient to permit the use of force under Article 51, then the
official language needs to be consistent with that assessment.
B. Develop Norms for "Red Lines"
It is vitally important, however, to appreciate that simply
because a particular cyber act may legally constitute an "armed
attack" that might qualify for the political characterization of an
"act of war," that does not necessarily mean that a country is
obliged to respond to it with force. Indeed, there are many
political reasons that would counsel against doing so. This is
where Mr. Painter is mistaken in regards to his discussion about
"strategic ambiguity."l06
In deterrence, ambiguity may be useful with respect to a
response, but it is markedly less so when you are talking about the
threshold. Misunderstandings as to where the proverbial "red
lines" are set can lead to dangerous miscalculation, unintended
escalation, and unwanted conflict.o' Given the enormous potential
of cyber acts to do harm, potential actors ought not to get mixed
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messages as to how the United States considers harmful cyber
activities.
Frustrations with the opaqueness as what cyber activity would
constitute a casus belli appears to have motivated Congressman
Mike Rounds to propose a bill earlier this year that would require
the President to develop a policy for determining "when an action
carried out in cyberspace constitutes an act of war against the
[United States] ." 108
Rounds points to testimony of Marine Lt. Gen. Vincent
Stewart, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as part of his
rational for the legislation.109 Stewart admitted that a "much fuller
definition of the range of things that occur in cyber space [is
needed], and then [we should] start thinking about the threshold
where an attack is catastrophic enough or destructive enough that
we define it as an act of war, I think that would be extremely
helpful."110
Stewart is not alone in not "fully" understanding where the
threshold lies. Other Pentagon leaders apparently are equally
uncertain,m something that raises the obvious question: if our
leaders do not know, how can we expect potential adversaries to
understand which acts might spark a full-blown war? At the same
time, except in the most aggravated cases, enumerating in advance
precisely which cyber acts exceed the use of force threshold might
be nearly impossible.
This is where norm development in international law comes
into play. In developing norms, the United States needs to use the
language of international law. Political terms like "digital acts of
war" are unhelpful not only because they do not track with the
language of the law, but because they also can imply to the general
public a level of response that is unnecessarily provocative and
even inconsistent with the proportionality and necessity factors
intrinsic to a lawful exercise of self-defense, especially in the
108

Cyber Act of War Act of 2016, H.R. 5220, 114th Cong.§ I (2016).
Mike Rounds, Defining a Cyber Act of War, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2016, 4:08
https://www.wsj.com/articles/defining-a-cyber-act-of-war-1462738124
PM),
[https://perma.cc/6KVT-479C].
109

110

Id.

Bryant Jordan, US Still Has No Definition/or Cyber Act of War, MILITARY.COM
(Jun. 22, 2016), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/06/22/us-still-has-nodefinition-for-cyber-act-of-war.html [https://perma.cc/N68X-EXWP].
lll

1010

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLII

complex cyber arena.11
As discussed, the United States has, in fact, laid out in broad
terms what kind of cyber activities it wants to deter, and generally
how it interprets the law applicable to cyber operations.1 13 What is
required now is for the United States to act consistently with these
conceptual positions when cyber incidents actually occur. We
now seem to be in a cycle in which we are facing ever more
dangerous and damaging cyber incidents, yet they are rarely given
the appellations established U.S. legal interpretations would seem
to require. Instead, incidents too often are characterized with
language that would put them outside the kinds of activities that
would authorize a forceful Article 51 response.
The United States also has to be more forthright about its
response to incidents because that too influences norm
development. True, there may be times, as the White House
spokesman Josh Ernest said, that the United States would "never
announce" a response to a particular cyber incident, but that
should very much be the exception and not the rule.1 14 As
Bloomberg News' Eli Lake argued last July after the DNC hack:
[T]here is also a consequence for keeping quiet. It might give
Russian hackers the impression that the [United States] is
uninterested in deterring them. Indeed, it appears they are under
that impression already.115

Transparency should not be underestimated as a deterrence
factor.116 Potential cyber attackers calculate exactly what kind of
malicious activity will generate a response, and how costly that
response might be.
VII. The Bigger Picture
It is crucial that the United States unmistakably express its
positions about cyber incidents it has suffered, particularly given
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the approach of two of the world's most formidable cyber actors.
Professor Schmitt noted in 2014 that:
The UN Group of Governmental Experts, which includes
representatives from Russia and China, agreed in 2013 that
international law applies to cyberspace. Interestingly, Russia
and China did not agree to a reference to international
humanitarian law and China reportedly does not accept the
applicability of IHL in cyberspace.117

For example, the Chinese acknowledge that "although the
existing laws on armed conflicts and general international
principles may all apply to cyberspace, there are still many issues
that need clarification ... [t]he international community should,
therefore, revise existing laws[ -]but it is important that this
international legal framework maintains sufficient openness and
flexibility."n 8
Although purportedly not officially speaking for the Chinese
government, Professor Huang Zhi Xiong of China's Wuhan
University Institute of International Law is reported to have shared
the opinion that:
In his view, the Tallinn factors relevant to evaluating when a
cyber activity rises to a use of force (which include severity,
directness, and invasiveness) are too malleable and the bar for
what activities are uses of force should be higher. Second, he
sought a higher bar than Tallinn 1.0 sets for when a state may
invoke the right of self-defense. In his view, a state does not
have a right of self-defense against attacks by non-state actors,
nor does a state have the right of self-defense against an
imminent attack.119

If the Chinese government de facto adopts (or has already
adopted) Professor ZhiXiong's view as to the inapplicability of the
right to self-defense in cyber incidents, and Russia fuses with that
view, their combined impact would be very influential in the
development of an international norm that is contrary to the U.S.
view.
117 Michael M. Schmitt, The Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis?, 25 STAN. L. &
PoL'Y REV. 269,271 n.7 (2014) (citation omitted).
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119 Ashley Deeks, Tallinn 2 .0 and a Chinese View on the Tallinn Process, LA WFARE
(May 31, 2015, 2:00 PM), https://www .lawfareblog.com/tallinn-20-and-chinese-view
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VIII. Conclusion
It is inarguable that the United States needs to be judicious in
its characterizations of, and responses to, cyber events.120 No one
wants to unnecessarily aggravate an already difficult situation.
Uncertainty as to how to effectively respond and still avoid
counterproductive escalation is a real problem of deterrence. But
before determining whether and how to respond, the legal options
need to be apparent. In that regard, the United States is at the
point where it needs to be more forthright when incidents occur
that appear to violate its own announced standards as to when a
cyber action equates to an "armed attack."
Again, calling something the equivalent of an "armed attack"
so as to permit a forceful and proportional response in self-defense
under Article 51 does not mean that such action would necessarily
be forthcoming in every instance. Rather, it would make it
unmistakable to all concerned that the United States asserts it has a
lawful option to use force in self-defense if it chooses to do so, not
that it will in each case.
As the United States fails to properly characterize cyber
incidents, and frequently suggests that they are simply vandalism,
thefts, or other matters which are readily interpreted by cyber
actors and publics around the world as being within the law
enforcement modality and outside of the jus ad bellum legal
regime, no one should be surprised if norms begin to emerge more
in keeping with what Russia, China, and hostile cyber actors
prefer.
Deterrence in the cyber realm quite obviously needs
strengthening, and dealing with the legal piece of that effort
matters. We still have the chance to set the record straight-to
develop that "body of law," Director Clapper believes we are
missing-but that opportunity diminishes with each passing
incident where the proper legal characterization is understated and
muddled.
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